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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the statutory limits which have been placed on foreign
nationals wishing to initiate judicial review proceedings challenging decisions made in the
asylum and immigration process and to establish whether the correct balance has been struck
between protecting immigrants’ rights and the policy objectives of the Government to have
judicial review cases in this area dealt with speedily. The restrictions are more onerous than
those that an applicant would face when seeking to bring judicial review proceedings under
Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 and a considerable amount of case law and
commentary has developed in this area.
The research methodology I will use is based on a review and critical analysis of relevant
Irish and international legislation, case law, legal doctrine and reform proposals. This method
will enable me to identify and scrutinise the most authoritative current and historical
literature available on this subject and to conclude whether a fair balance has been struck
between protecting immigrant’s rights and the common good, in the restrictions imposed on
initiating judicial review proceedings.
As set down in s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, an application for leave
to seek judicial review must be made within 14 days from the date on which the person was
notified of the decision and such application must be on notice to the Minister. This period
can only be extended where there is “good and sufficient reason” for doing so. Leave is
granted only where the Court is satisfied that there are “substantial grounds”. There is no
appeal to the Supreme Court except with the leave of the High Court and where that Court
certifies that its decision “involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it
is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court.” The
Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 was the subject of a Supreme Court reference and
its constitutionality was upheld.1
In Chapter 1, I will analyse the time limit of 14 days from the date on which the person was
notified of the decision, within which an application for leave to seek judicial review must be
made. Similar time limits have been set down in other areas of law such as in planning
1

In re Article 26 of the Constitution and sections 5 and 10 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999
[2000] 2 IR 360
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legislation which I will analyse. There is a potential conflict between this limit and an
applicant’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, which I will consider,
along with the recommendations for reform to the limit. Similarly, with the restriction on
when the courts can extend this time limit, I will analyse its operation in case law both in
asylum cases and where other similar legislation exists and discuss the changes which have
been proposed in the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008.
In Chapter 2, I will analyse the substantial grounds requirements which an applicant must
meet in order to obtain leave to seek judicial review. I will also analyse, firstly, whether
judicial review should be granted where an alternative remedy is available such as an appeal
to an independent tribunal, and secondly, the level of judicial intervention which is desirable,
to ensure that blatantly unfair or unreasonable decisions are not permitted to go unchecked, in
light of important personal rights and freedoms which may be at stake. The test as it currently
stands was laid down in O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála2 and can be summarised as whether the
decision flew in the face of reason and common sense or, alternatively whether there was any
basis for the decision in question. This test is currently the subject of a Supreme Court
appeal.3
In Chapter 3, I will analyse the requirement that an application for judicial review must be
made by motion on notice to the Minister and any other person specified for that purpose by
order of the High Court and whether this requirement should be mandatory for all cases
which come within the legislation.4 I will examine the non-suspensive effect of deportation
and transfer orders where legal proceedings are initiated. I will also analyse the restriction on
appealing a High Court decision, that there is to be no appeal unless the High Court certifies
that its own decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is in
the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court. I shall also consider
the right that applicants have to a fair trial and due process and analyse whether the State is
fulfilling its obligations according to international standards.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I will consider the proposed reforms to the statutory restrictions which
2
3
4

[1993] 1 I.R. 39
Meadows v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Attorney General (Unreported, High
Court, Gilligan J., 19th November 2003)
See s.5 (1) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 (as amended) for a list of decisions, refusals,
notifications, determinations and recommendations which come within the ambit of this legislation. It has
been proposed that this list be expanded in s.118 (1) of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008.
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an applicant faces when seeking to take judicial review proceedings, challenging a negative
decision made in the asylum process. There have been many proposed reforms, including the
Law Reform Commission Report on Judicial Review Procedure5 and the Immigration,
Residence and Protection Bill 2008 published 29th January 2008, which, at the time of
writing, is at Committee stage in Dáil Éireann. I will analyse the leading submissions related
to the restrictions under the Bill, published prior to April 20th 2008.

Judicial Review in the Asylum and Immigration Process
One of the features of Ireland's constitutional system of justice is the system whereby the
High Court has power to review the administrative actions of public and private bodies. The
judicial review process is not an appeal from the decision in question, but is a way of
ensuring that public powers are exercised in accordance with basic standards of legality,
fairness and rationality. Judicial review proceedings are initiated by the making of an
application to the High Court for leave to seek judicial review pursuant to Order 84 of the
Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. The court determining the review will not normally
substitute its own decision on the substance for that of the decision-maker. Judicial review is
thus a procedural rather than a substantive remedy and it has been determined that the judicial
review process complies with Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which guarantees the right to an effective remedy before national authorities.6
A successful application for judicial review can result in a variety of reliefs being granted. An
order of certiorari quashes the decision made and the court may direct that the decision be
reconsidered by the initial decision maker in accordance with the findings of the court. An
order of mandamus compels a body to perform a duty imposed by law, while an order of
prohibition restrains a body from embarking on or continuing a given course of action. The
rarely sought relief of quo warranto determines whether someone in authority has a right to
hold such a position. The court may also grant injunctive relief directing or preventing a body
from acting on decisions, a declaration that the decision was unlawful or unreasonable and
damages.
The judicial review system, although of long standing in Irish law, was not based on or

5
6

(LRC 71 – 2004), February 2004
Vilvarajah & Ors v. United Kingdom [1991] ECHR 47
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regulated in any general way by a primary statute.7 The effect of section 5 of the Illegal
Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 was to enshrine into primary legislation, for the first time,
a code of law governing judicial review of decisions made in immigration and asylum
matters.8 Section 5 offers a statutory guarantee to those in the immigration and asylum
processes that they will have the opportunity to have the courts review any step in those
processes where there is a substantial basis for doing so, in a coherent, fair and expeditious
manner. It was envisaged that the High Court's valuable time would not be taken up with
applications which can be disposed of at an early stage, such as those which are frivolous or
vexatious and also to enable a decision, which was taken in a proper and lawful manner, to be
executed. The legislation was designed to ensure that:
“Where all due procedures have resulted in a determination that there is no basis for a
non-national's continued stay in the State, the judicial review process cannot be used
to delay that person's departure if no substantial case can be made which would
warrant a postponement.”9
As can be seen from the lengthy asylum judicial review lists which are before the Court
waiting to be determined, the restrictions have not had the desired effect which the Executive
sought in having cases determined promptly. Currently, there are delays in some cases of
several years for a case to be determined from the time it was initiated until judgment or a
settlement agreement is reached, which is clearly undesirable. Stack and Shipsey10 have
commented that:
“Section 5 significantly delays the determination of (costly) leave applications, thereby
preventing the state from enforcing or relying upon decisions and orders against which
no stateable challenge can be raised.”
Under the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008, section 5 of the Illegal
7
8
9

10

Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 remains part of only a Statutory Instrument (S.I. No.
15/1986)
Similar legislation had been enacted in for example s.13 of the Irish Takeover Panel, Act 1997 and s.50 of
the Planning and Development Act 2000
John O’Donoghue, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. Dáil Debates, Dáil Éireann – Volume 514
– 516 February, 2000. Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999, Instruction to Committee.
www.oireachtas.ie
Stack and Shipsey, “Judicial Review and the Asylum Process” in Fraser and Harvey ed., Sanctuary in
Ireland, Perspectives in Asylum Law and Policy, (2003) 168, 175

5

Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 is to be abolished, to be replaced by similar restrictions
and some new measures, which if become law would go some way to deter those wishing to
bring frivolous or vexatious proceedings and assist in having cases determined more
promptly.
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Chapter 1: 14 DAY TIME LIMIT
Section 5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 states that:
An application for leave to apply for judicial review under the Order11 in respect of any of the
matters referred to in subsection (1) shall –
(a) be made within the period of 14 days commencing on the date on which the person
was notified of the decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or making of the
Order concerned unless the High Court considers that there is good and sufficient
reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made.
“Modern legislation shows an increasing impatience with endless legal challenges to
decisions of administrative bodies and ministerial decisions. These time limits are
measured in weeks rather than months and require an applicant to move with alacrity if
he is not to be debarred from making an application for judicial review. Pursuant to
many of these schemes, the potential injustice that might be caused by the imposition
of strict time limits has been mitigated somewhat by provision being made for
extensions of time to be granted where there is “good and sufficient” reason for doing
so.”12
The Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 was introduced as part of the response to the
delays resulting from judicial reviews of decisions taken under the asylum process arising out
of the growth in numbers of immigrants coming to this country. The 14 day time limit is
substantially shorter than the general three month limit for all reliefs except certiorari, which
has a six month time limit for seeking judicial review as set out in Order 84 of the Rules of
the Superior Courts 1986, although there is an obligation to act promptly within that time.13
The 14 day time limit reflects similar limits introduced by the Oireachtas in other situations
where decisions can only be challenged by way of judicial review proceedings and where the
need for certainty and finality is particularly strong. For example, in s.82 (3B)(a)(i) of the
11
12
13

Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986
Kearns J. O'Brien v Moriarty [2005] 2 ILRM 321 at 343
De Roiste v Minister for Defence. Unreported, Mc Cracken J., High Court, 28th June 1999, where Mc
Cracken J. stated that the primary provision is that an application for judicial review must be made promptly
and it is only a secondary requirement that, in any event, the application must be made within the stated time
depending on the nature of the application. Delivering her judgment in the Supreme Court in De Roiste v
Minister for Defence [2001] IESC 4, Denham J. also stated that the first condition as to time is that the
application be brought promptly and that whether this requirement is met will depend on the circumstances.
In some circumstances even if the application is brought within months of the decision being challenged it
may not be sufficiently prompt.

7

Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1963, a time limit of two months was set
for bringing an application for judicial review of a decision of a planning authority or An
Bord Pleanála commencing on the date the decision is given. Also a limit of seven days was
set under s.13(3)(a) of the Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997.
It is interesting to note that the 14 day limit in s.5(1) commences on the date on which the
person was notified of the “decision, determination, recommendation, refusal or making of
the order concerned” unless the court dispenses with this requirement. What constitutes a
“refusal” was considered by the Supreme Court in S v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform.14 The Applicant was refused asylum under s.17(1) of the Refugee Act 1996 and she
then sought the consent of the Minister to make a further application under s.17(7) of the
1996 Act. This request was subsequently refused by the Minister and judicial review
proceedings commenced seeking a declaration that the Respondent had erred in law and acted
ultra vires the Refugee Act 1996 in refusing consent. The Applicant argued that the reference
to a refusal under s.17 of the Refugee Act 1996 captured only a refusal to grant a declaration
of refugee status pursuant to s. 17(1), and did not extend to a refusal of consent to reapply
under s.17(7). This argument was rejected by the Supreme Court on the basis that there was
no ambiguity in the wording of s.5(1) of the 1996 Act, and that applying the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word “refusal”, it was clear that the section encompassed a refusal to
grant consent pursuant to s.17(7).
The restrictive nature of the 14 day limit has the aim of ensuring the speedy determination of
an applicant’s status, so that any person not entitled to remain in the country would be
removed expeditiously. However, it is the most criticised aspect of the limits constraining the
initiation of judicial review proceedings and continues to be heavily criticised by many
concerned parties, as the time limit remains unchanged in the latest Immigration, Residence
and Protection Bill which was published on 29th January 2008.15 In an effort to justify the 14
day time limit in the Dáil debates on the subject of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill
1999, the then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform John O'Donoghue sought to
bring the time limit in line with the time in which a failed asylum seeker has to leave the
State. He also stated the time limit:
14
15

[2005] 1 ILRM 73
At Committee stage of the 2008 Bill it has been proposed that the time limit should be 28 days instead of 14.
Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights. “List of Proposed Committee Stage
Amendments”, 16 April 2008. www.oireachtas.ie at page 82
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“..will ensure that the rights of all concerned in cases of this type are vindicated
without undue delay, and that includes ensuring that court time is not unduly spent on
applications for judicial review which do not have a substantial basis.”16
Against the proposition of a 14 day time limit in In re Article 26 of the Constitution and
sections 5 and 10 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999,17 Counsel argued that:
“..the limitation of fourteen days within which to initiate the judicial review procedure
renders a person's right of access to the courts so excessively difficult as to be arbitrary,
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.”
However Counsel on behalf of the Attorney General argued that:
“There are public policy objectives in ensuring that illegal immigrants challenging
deportation orders do so as quickly as possible, as otherwise they may tend to become
enmeshed further in Irish society only thereafter to be forced to leave. In any case, any
effective deportation system must be able to function efficiently and distinguish
quickly between genuine refugees and other migrants not entitled to enter or remain in
the State. It was also submitted that an inefficient system for processing such asylum
applications and implementing deportation in the case of illegal immigrants would act
as a ‘magnet’ attracting illegal immigrants from elsewhere and would further
undermine the functioning of the system.”18
Counsel assigned by the Court placed particular reliance on the judgment of Costello J. in
Brady v. Donegal County Council.19 In that case the Plaintiff had challenged the
constitutionality of the two month time limit imposed by section 82(3A) of the Local
Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963 as amended by section 42 of the Local
Government (Planning and Development) Act on the bringing of proceedings to question the
validity of planning decisions. The time limit was held to be unconstitutional as there was no
16
17
18
19

Dáil Debates, Dáil Éireann – Volume 514 – 516 February, 2000. Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999,
Instruction to Committee www.oireachtas.ie
[2000] 2 IR 360 at 376
Ibid. At 379
[1989] ILRM 282
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saver clause to allow the time to be extended in any scenario. While he acknowledged that the
objective of the time limit to avoid unnecessary costs and wasteful appeals is important,
Costello J. concluded that the limitation was unreasonable. Costello J. stated:
“A law which imposes a very short time limit which may well deprive a plaintiff of a
judicial remedy before he knew he had a cause of action can obviously cause
considerable hardship. But if the plaintiff's ignorance of his rights during the short
limitation period is caused by the defendant's own wrong-doing and the law still
imposes an absolute bar unaccompanied by any judicial discretion to raise it there must
be very compelling reasons indeed to justify such a rigorous limitation on the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right.”20
Although this case was successfully appealed in the Supreme Court, a more flexible formula
was introduced by s.50(4) of the Planning and Development Act 200021 which lays down an
eight week time period to bring judicial review proceedings and the High Court is given
discretion to extend the time for the bringing of proceedings where it considers that there is
good and sufficient reason for doing so. The discretion to extend such shortened time limits
was introduced by amendment into the planning legislation to meet constitutional concerns
and has also been included in other areas to which similar restrictions have been applied.
In my opinion, the fourteen day time limit is too short. While State funded legal supports are
available to all asylum-seekers at every stage of the process, an applicant may wish to raise
complex legal issues in challenging the decision made and the time limit as it stands makes it
difficult to the point of being unfair on such a person to adequately prepare a legal challenge.
In reality, where the 14 day time limit is not met, the time limit is readily extended by the
Court, therefore I would agree with the recommendation of the Law Reform Commission22
that the time limit should be extended to 28 days. Delaney23 has commented that the courts
are willing to grant an extension of time to ensure that justice will prevail, even when the
proceedings are brought out of time:
“Clearly, given the relatively shorter time periods laid down in statutory judicial review
20
21
22
23

Ibid at 393
Substituted by s.13 of the Planning and Development (Strategic Infrastructure) Act 2006
“Report on Judicial Review Procedure” (LRC 71 – 2004) at page 49, February 2004.
Delaney, “The Requirement to Act “Promptly” in Judicial Review Proceedings”, (2005) 23 ILT 229 at 232
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schemes and the absence of any specific requirement to act promptly, the issue of
applications for judicial review being defeated within these time frames is not a
particularly significant one. In view of the very limited time frame laid down in
s.5(2)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, it will certainly not be an
issue in such cases and recent practice shows that extensions of time will be relatively
readily granted even where applications are brought a further 14 days beyond the
period specified. [ S v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 163
; CS v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] 1 I.L.R.M. 81 ]”
The fact that the time limit is so readily extended by the Court leads me to the conclusion that
it must in its nature be unfair and unjust. The grounds under which the time limit can be
extended by the court are, it is proposed, to be curtailed under s.118(3) Immigration,
Residence and Protection Bill 2008. I believe, therefore, that a time limit of 28 days together
with these new restrictions on extending the time limit would bring about a fairer balance
between the objectives of the Executive and the rights of failed asylum seekers and that the
Court would be less inclined to extend such a time limit.24
Retaining the 14 day time-limit may give rise to a violation of rights under the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular Article 6, which provides that everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. It is conceivable that the courts might entertain a claim
that the application of the 14 day time-limit violates Art.6 because it limits an applicant's
ability to participate effectively in proceedings or indeed, because it limits his or her access to
court.
In Stubbings v. UK25 the Court held that in order to be in accordance with Article 6(1) of the
ECHR, the limitations applied must not “restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in

24

25

Several concerned parties have argued that the time limit should be extended, for example the Irish Human
Rights Commission in their “Observations on the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008” at page
61, published March 19th 2008. www.ihrc.ie. The Law Society of Ireland “Submission on the Immigration,
Residence and Protection Bill” at page 76, published 7th April 2008 www.lawsociety.ie, conclude that the
time limit is “inadequate”, “unjust” and “unworkable” and should be extended to at least 20 days. Perhaps
one of the reasons why the 14 day time limit is not amended is that the doors would be open again to lawyers
to attack its constitutionality, which was upheld in In re Article 26 of the Constitution and sections 5 and 10
of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] 2 IR 360
[1997] 23 EHRR 213
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such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.”26 The Irish
Human Rights Commission27 has also commented that the time limit together with the
restrictions on extending this creates unnecessary difficulties for persons seeking to challenge
immigration decisions and may prevent some persons from making such applications, which
would be in violation of Article 13 of the ECHR:
“A further key aspect of the case-law of the ECHR is that the scope of the State’s
obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s
complaint. Where irreversible harm might ensue, it will not be sufficient that the
remedies are merely as effective as can be; they must provide much more certain
guarantees of effectiveness.”28

Extending the 14 Day Limit
In “conventional” judicial review applications the Court will extend the period within which
an application may be made where it considers that there is good reason for doing so. Section
5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 is more restrictive as it states that the time
limit will not be extended unless the High Court considers that there is “good and sufficient
reason” for doing so. The power of the Court to extend the time for the bringing of a judicial
review application is of great importance for the protection of the constitutional right of
access to the Courts of persons affected by decisions vital to their interests. It enables persons
who, having regard to all the circumstances of their case including language difficulties,
communication difficulties, difficulties with regard to legal advice or otherwise, who have
shown reasonable diligence, to have sufficient access to the courts for the purpose of seeking
judicial review. The Supreme Court found in In re Article 26 of the Constitution and sections
5 and 10 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 199929 that the discretion of the Court to
extend the time to apply for leave where the applicant shows “good and sufficient reason” for
doing so was wide and ample enough to avoid injustice where an applicant has been unable
through no fault of his or her own or for good and sufficient reason to bring the application
within the fourteen day period.
26
27
28
29

Ibid. at para 50
IHRC, “Observations on the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008” at page 57, published March
19th 2008. www.ihrc.ie
Chahal v United Kingdom, Judgement of 15 November 1996, (1997) 23 EHRR 413, para. 151.
[2000] 2 IR 360
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In CS v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform30 the Applicants brought an
application for judicial review outside the 14 day time limit, therefore an order extending the
time was sought from the High Court. In the course of the hearing before the Supreme Court,
it was accepted by the parties that the principal issue concerned the extension of time. The
Respondent submitted that there had been no satisfactory explanation provided for how the
delay had arisen and that the trial judge had erred in attributing blame to the Refugee Legal
Service. It was submitted by the Applicants that the major part of the delay was due to the
fault of the Applicants' solicitor and that the fault should not be visited on their head.
McGuinness J. referred to the observations of Finnegan J. in G.K. v. Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform31 where he held:
“In determining the extent to which an applicant should be held vicariously liable for
the default of his solicitor it is important to bear in mind the serious consequences
which could result from an application failing because of delay...Where an applicant is
deported, the consequences for him may be very serious indeed in that he may be
deported to a State in which his fundamental rights would not be vindicated.”
The Supreme Court in CS found that the applicant demonstrated 'reasonable diligence' in
seeking access to the Court and therefore there would be good reason to extend the time
period.
In the Supreme Court judgment in G.K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform32, it
was stressed that, where an Applicant seeks an order extending time to apply for judicial
review proceedings in relation to a decision governed by s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants
(Trafficking) Act 2000, in considering whether there is good and sufficient reason for
extending the period within which the application must be made, the Court should have
regard to the merits of the substantive case and not simply the merits of the application to
extend time. In that case the Applicant had been granted an extension of time to bring judicial
review proceedings and this decision was appealed by the Minister. Hardiman J. referred to

30
31
32

[2005] 1 ILRM 81
[2002] 1 ILRM 81at 87
[2002] 1 ILRM 401
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Éire Continental Trading Co. Ltd v. Clonmel Foods Ltd33 and the preconditions which were
laid down relating to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to extend time, the third of which
relates to the existence of an arguable case on appeal. Lavery J. also stressed that an applicant
ought to show the Court that his proposed appeal has substance and is not merely intended to
gain time and to postpone the day of reckoning. A bona fide intention to appeal therefore
must be demonstrated and this must be formed within the permitted time.
In considering whether the blame for the delay should be visited vicariously on the applicant
so as to prevent their access to the court, McGuinness J. in the G.K. case noted that the
applicants had suffered many of the disadvantages described by the Supreme Court in In re
Article 26 of the Constitution and sections 5 and 10 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking)
Bill 199934, including unfamiliarity with the Irish legal system and the fact that the first
named Applicant lived some considerable distance from her solicitor's place of business.
McGuinness J. also noted that while the first named Applicant had been represented by the
Refugee Legal Service (RLS) up to the stage of her appeal, she was thereafter informed that
the RLS could do nothing further for her, which would have caused both confusion and
distress. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded that the Applicants had failed to
establish any basis for extending the time and overturned the High Court decision.
Delaney35 has commented that the test laid down by the Supreme Court in G.K. may be
unduly restrictive and she supports the argument that in statutory schemes of judicial review
the balance has swung too far against those seeking to challenge decisions of State authorities
and that perhaps a more equitable formula should be adopted. Delaney36 has also argued that
the test suggested by Barr J. in Solan v. Director of Public Prosecutions,37 to the effect that
where an application is made out of time the applicant is obliged to satisfy the Court that in
all the circumstances it is in the interest of justice that time for the making of the application
should be extended, would be more equitable. Recent case law has, however, shown that the
Court will still look for substantial grounds to be present before the time limit will be
extended.38 The applicants in the U.L. case sought an extension of time to amend their
33
34
35
36
37
38

[1955] IR 170
[2000] 2 IR 360
Delaney “Extension of Time for Bringing Judicial Review Procedures Pursuant to s.5 of the Illegal
Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000”, [2002] 20 ILT 44 at 48
Ibid.
[1989] ILRM 491 at 493
U.L. v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Unreported, MacMenamin J., High Court, 28th
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statement of grounds under s.5(2)(a) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000.
However MacMenamin J. concluded that:
“While in other circumstances a court might be inclined to extend the time, on such
facts the essential issue here is that no substantial grounds have been established and
consequently, no basis to extend the time for the amendment of the statement of
grounds is established.”

In B v The Governor of the Training Unit Glengariff Parade39 again the issue to be decided
was whether or not the Applicant was entitled to an extension of time to bring judicial review
proceedings. The Applicant had not received a copy of his deportation order; however this
was due to him not informing the Minister of his new address. As the Applicant had been
involved in the immigration process for an appreciable time and was aware that the Minister
was considering making a deportation order against him, Fennelly J. determined that the
blame should be attributed to the Applicant, for failing to keep the Minister up-to-date on his
place of residence and that as the Applicant’s case was devoid of merit an extension of time
therefore was not granted. Fennelly J. stated:
“If he had been genuinely concerned to learn of developments, he would indeed have
communicated with his former address or made arrangements to have any post
forwarded or ensured that his solicitor had his current address. For all these reasons he
is in an extremely weak position to ask the court to extend the time or to criticise the
Minister for delay...it is reasonable to conclude that he merely wished to prolong his
now illegal presence in the State and no wish or intention to take any further
proceedings.”40
In B and S v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform,41 the interesting question arose
as to whether an appeal against the refusal to extend time could be brought without the leave
of the High Court. Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the application for an extension
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of time is a separate and distinct application, which must be considered and either allowed or
refused prior to the Court's consideration of the actual application for leave to bring judicial
review proceedings and prior to any “determination” of the application. Counsel for the
Respondents submitted that it was the clear intention and policy of the 2000 Act that there
should be no appeal from the determination of the Court in relation to either leave to issue
judicial review proceedings or the judicial review proceedings themselves. The Supreme
Court ruled that a person who has been refused an extension of time for leave to apply for
judicial review, may bring an appeal without first obtaining leave.
Much of the jurisprudence dealing with the issue of extending the time limit for an applicant
to initiate judicial review proceedings has come from proceedings taken against planning
decisions, where almost identical legislation has been enacted in relation to judicial review
proceedings taken against those decisions. In Blessington and District Community Council
Limited v Wicklow County Council and Aosog Centres Limited42 the Applicants sought leave
to apply for judicial review of a decision of Wicklow County Council to grant planning
permission. The application was far outside the two-month period prescribed by statute for
the commencement of judicial review proceedings pursuant to section 19 of the Local
Government (Planning and Development) Act 1992; therefore, Kelly J. refused leave to apply
for judicial review. In refusing leave on all the non-constitutional grounds, Kelly J. also
referred to the judgment of Finlay C.J. in Brady v Donegal County Council43 where it had
been asserted by the Plaintiffs that the limitation provision of two months which applied for
testing the validity of a planning permission was unconstitutional because of the absence of a
saver clause which would enable the Court to enlarge the period in favour of a plaintiff in
exceptional circumstances. Finlay C.J. held that:

“The whole issue of constitutional validity depends in this case upon the submission
with regard to the absence from the subsection of ‘a saver against an exceptional case
such as the present one.’ If the present case is not exceptional..then the absence of any
saver from this subsection has not damnified the plaintiffs nor would its presence have
been of advantage to them.”44
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In Ni Eili v. The Environmental Protection Agency and Others45 which concerned an
application for leave to amend grounds for seeking judicial review by, inter alia, raising
questions concerning the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Environmental
Protection Agency Act 1992, Kelly J. was of the view that the amendments sought amounted
to an additional and entirely new case and that the new grounds were very different to those
already advanced and represented a new cause of action. The Court was of the view the
Applicant should not be permitted to present a new cause of action effectively by way of an
amendment to her existing proceedings as it would run “counter to the will of Parliament as
expressed in Section 85(8) of the Act.”46 While the two month time limit creates a substantial
burden on plaintiffs, Kelly J. was of the view that it would be impermissible to permit new
grounds to be introduced. However, if an obvious and substantial injustice would be done and
an applicant was deprived of the opportunity to litigate their claim where they had a very
strong, indeed almost unanswerable case, the Court would, notwithstanding that the delay in
taking proceedings was inexcusable, be more willing to allow amended grounds to be
presented, even if the time limit has passed.47
Under s.118(3) of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008, it has been proposed
that the grounds upon which the time limit can be extended, be curtailed. If enacted, the High
Court may not extend the time period set except for in a number of specific situations or
where there are exceptional circumstances. The Irish Human Rights Commission48 (IHRC)
and the Law Society of Ireland49 are concerned that the grounds upon which the High Court
can extend this time limit are being unfairly restricted and they have proposed that the
grounds should be the same as those currently set out in Section 5(2)(a) of the Illegal
Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000.50 I consider that these proposals are at risk of a successful
constitutional challenge and that they fail to comply with obligations under Article 6(1) and
Article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
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Following Brady v. Donegal County Council51 the legislature, concerned that the Planning
legislation was constitutionally unsound, gave the High Court discretion to extend the 8 week
time limit for the bringing of proceedings, where it considers that there is good and sufficient
reason for doing so. This has now been amended by s.13(8) of the Planning and Development
(Strategic Infrastructure) Act 2006 with an additional requirement that the High Court must
be satisfied, that the circumstances that resulted in the failure to make the application for
leave within the period so provided, were outside the control of the applicant for the
extension. The grounds where the Court may extend the time in s.118(3) of the Immigration,
Residence and Protection Bill 2008 are even more restrictive than those in the Planning
legislation and this together with a substantially shorter time limit leaves this section of the
Bill at real risk of being declared unconstitutional.
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Chapter 2: SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS
In order to obtain leave to seek judicial review an applicant must establish substantial
grounds rather than merely showing that he has a stateable case. This is a higher threshold
than that which operates in conventional judicial review. As was noted by the Law
Commission of England and Wales:52
“Ill-founded applications delay finality in decision making: they exploit and exacerbate
delays within the judicial system and are detrimental to the progress of well founded
legal challenges.”
Carroll J. interpreted this test in McNamara v. An Bord Pleanála53 as “reasonable, arguable,
not trivial or tenuous.” McGuinness J. in support of Carroll J.'s interpretation commented in
Zgnat'ev v Minister for Justice54 that:
“As regards the requirement that an applicant for leave to issue judicial review
proceedings establish ‘substantial grounds’ that an administrative decision is invalid or
ought to be quashed, this is not an unduly onerous requirement since the High Court
must decline leave only where it is satisfied that the application could not succeed or
where the grounds relied on are not reasonable or are ‘trivial or tenuous’.”
This requirement to establish substantial grounds at leave stage leads to the position that the
Court must engage in a more probing examination of the arguments than would be required
under conventional judicial review proceedings and strengthens the argument that this results
in a double hearing of the case.
Smyth J. in the decision of P. v Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform55 indicated that
it is appropriate in the leave stage to consider the prospects of success, and to grant leave only
if satisfied that the Applicant's case is not merely arguable but is strong; that is to say, is
likely to succeed. Simons56 has commented that this approach “brings the High Court at the
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leave stage tantalizingly close to a final determination”. Rogan57 has argued that the test may
not be necessary at all:
“In ordinary judicial review applications, the court always has jurisdiction to strike out
frivolous or vexatious actions. As pointed out by Kelly J. in O’Leary v. Minister for
Transport, Energy and Communications ([2000] 1 ILRM 391) “the judicial review
procedure is designed so as to ensure that cases which are frivolous, vexatious or of no
substance cannot be begun”. It is thus arguable that the substantial grounds requirement
is unnecessary and given the special human rights context, the strict time limits and the
difficulties of the Refugee Legal Service, the requirement in fact, interferes with the
right of access to the courts, goes beyond the aim of the Act to expedite such cases and
indeed may not fulfil it at all.”
Interestingly, while the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008 has retained the
requirement that substantial grounds be established,58 it has provided that where in the
opinion of the Court, the grounds put forward for contending that an act, decision or
determination is invalid or ought to be quashed are frivolous or vexatious, the Court may,
(whether on application or on its own motion) by its order, so declare and shall direct by
whom and in what proportion the costs are to be borne and paid.59 The section goes on to
state that where the Court forms an opinion of this kind, it may direct that the costs or a part
of the costs of the proceedings shall be borne by the legal representative of the applicant.60

Alternative Remedy
An interesting question is whether an applicant should be entitled to take judicial review
proceedings challenging an administrative decision made where it is possible to appeal this
decision to an independent body such as the Refugee Appeals Tribunal.61 Judicial review is
discretionary and may be refused where there is an adequate alternative remedy.62 In F.O.,
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Y.O. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform63 it was argued by the Applicant that
the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner made a fundamental error of law and
fact in stating that Nigeria had been designated a “safe country of origin” by the first named
Respondent. The application for asylum was not appealed however to the Refugee Appeals
Tribunal. The question arose therefore, as to whether an applicant should be allowed to
challenge decisions by way of application for judicial review when an adequate remedy is
available elsewhere. An order of certiorari would not be worthless as it would enable the
primary decision to be re-addressed in the light of all the evidence and an insufficiency of fair
procedures at first instance is not cured by a sufficiency on appeal. Mc Govern J. stated “It is
undesirable that parties should challenge decisions by way of application for judicial review
when an adequate remedy is available elsewhere.”64 However, he granted leave on the basis
that the Refugee Applications Commissioner considered the application for refugee status on
the basis of a fundamental error of fact.

In Stefan v. The Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform65 the Supreme Court held that
whereas judicial review was discretionary and could be refused where there was an adequate
alternative remedy, the Court nevertheless retained jurisdiction to exercise its discretion to
achieve a just result. Kelly J. had granted certiorari of the decision at first instance that the
Applicant’s application for refugee status in the State be refused, on the basis that the
translation of the questionnaire filled in by the Applicant was incomplete and it was ordered
that the matter be remitted back to the Minister. Reference was made to The State (Abenglen)
Properties v. Corporation of Dublin66 where Henchy J. stressed that he would refuse
certiorari in this case because the alleged errors of law were not made in excess of
jurisdiction and an alternative remedy existed. He stated (at 405):
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“where Parliament has provided a self-contained administrative and quasi- judicial
scheme, postulating only a limited use of the Courts, certiorari should not issue when,
as in the instant case, use of the statutory procedure for the correction of error was
adequate (and, indeed, more suitable) to meet the complaints on which the application
for certiorari is grounded.”

O'Higgins CJ. in Abenglen was of the view that if the decision impugned was made without
jurisdiction or in breach of natural justice then, normally, the existence of a right of appeal or
a failure to avail of such should be immaterial. Similarly, if an appeal can only deal with the
merits and not with the question of the jurisdiction involved, the existence of such ought not
to be a ground for refusing relief. Other than these, there may be cases where the decision
exhibits an error of law and a perfectly simple appeal can rectify the complaint. O' Higgins
C.J., who also refused certiorari, stated:

“The question immediately arises as to the effect of the existence of a right of appeal
or an alternative remedy on the exercise of the courts discretion. It is well established
that the existence of such a right or remedy ought not to prevent the court from acting.
It seems to me to be a question of justice. The court ought to take into account all the
circumstances of the case, including the purpose for which certiorari has been sought,
the adequacy of the alternative remedy and, of course, the conduct of the applicant.”67

In McGoldrick v. An Bord Pleanála68 Barron J. stated

“The real question to be determined where an appeal lies is the relative merits of an
appeal as against granting relief by way of judicial review. It is not just a question
whether an alternative remedy exists or whether the applicant has taken steps to
pursue such remedy. The true question is which is the more appropriate remedy
considered in the context of common sense, the ability to deal with the questions
raised and the principles of fairness; provided, of course, that the applicant has not
gone too far down one road to be estopped from changing his or her mind.”
67
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In the Stefan case it was held that the decision was made in breach of fair procedures as
material evidence was not before the decision-maker because of the omission in the
translation. Also it was held that the Appeals Authority process would not be appropriate or
adequate so as to withhold certiorari and the appeal was dismissed. In similar cases, I
consider that while retaining always the power to quash, the Court court should be slow to
grant certiorari unless satisfied that there has been a fundamental breach of fair procedures
and that the appeal remedy is unable to deal with the matter.
Section 50(4) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 now provides that the High Court is
empowered to stay judicial review proceedings pending the making of a decision by An Bord
Pleanála in relation to a parallel statutory appeal. Such a provision should be inserted into
asylum legislation, so as to give the High Court the ability to stay judicial review proceedings
challenging the decision made in an applicant’s initial application to the Office of the
Refugee Applications Commissioner (ORAC) pending the determination of an appeal taken
to the proposed Protection Review Tribunal. Should the decision at ORAC stage be
overturned on appeal, any proceedings in the High Court challenging the initial decision
would be rendered moot.
In Kayode Ogunyemi v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform69, the Applicant
was seeking inter alia an order quashing the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal that
the Applicant’s appeal against the recommendation of the Refugee Applications
Commissioner be refused. McGovern J. analysed whether or not the Applicant had
established substantial grounds in his application for leave. A major issue in the determination
of the Applicant’s claim before the Refugee Appeals Tribunal was the issue of his credibility.
Counsel for the Applicant referred to V.I. v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal,70 in which Clarke J. refers to his judgment in the
Gashi71 case where he indicated that for the purpose of a leave application it was arguable
that a higher degree of scrutiny was required than that set out in O'Keeffe v. An Bord
Pleanála.72 In other words he was suggesting that the “anxious scrutiny test” applied. Mc
Govern J. stated that:
69
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“While there seems to be some divergence of judicial opinion on this subject I am
inclined to agree with the view expressed by Clarke J. on this issue since applications
for leave to apply for judicial review in asylum matters have been put on a statutory
basis which is separate and distinct from other applications for judicial review where
fundamental human rights issues may not be considered.”73

However, even applying the “anxious scrutiny” test Mc Govern J. concluded that the
Applicant had not, in this case, discharged the burden of proving that there were substantial
grounds for contending that the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) was invalid
or ought to be quashed. Mc Govern J. was satisfied that the report of the RAT weighed up all
the issues and arguments and reached conclusions which were determined by what was
perceived to be a lack of credibility on the part of the Applicant on certain crucial issues. Mc
Govern J., therefore, refused leave to apply for judicial review.

Anxious Scrutiny
An interesting question which the Supreme Court has yet to fully consider is the level of
scrutiny which an administrative decision by the Executive should be subject. The test of
anxious scrutiny does not, at the moment, form part of Irish law but has been subject to
certain statements in the Supreme Court to the effect that if constitutional rights are at stake,
then the existing test of unreasonableness may fall short of what is likely to be required for
their protection. While the judicial review process is not as vigorous or penetrating as an
ordinary appeal on the merits, it may operate as a form of limited appeal, where the decision
made was disproportionate or irrational.
There is no definition of what anxious scrutiny may be beyond a general indication of a court
being required to take serious care where an applicant’s life or liberty may be at risk as a
consequence of a refusal of relief. Irish courts have generally shown no appetite to review
decisions of regulatory bodies, especially where the decision is made by an expert body
which has particular expertise and a body of experience.74 This does not mean that the Court
73
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will stand “in awe of or accord undue deference to any authority however distinguished.”75 In
New Zealand the High Court stressed that it will only interfere with a credibility finding by a
specialist tribunal such as the Refugee Status Appeals Authority in clear cases of
unreasonableness or serious errors of fact.76
The test which currently exists in Ireland is the O'Keeffe77 test, which can be summarised as
whether the decision was fundamentally at variance with reason and common sense, or
alternatively whether there was any basis for the decision in question. Judicial review is
primarily concerned with determining whether the decisions were made in accordance with
the law and in conformity with natural and constitutional justice. Only if a decision-making
authority has acted wholly irrationally, should the court intervene and quash the decision
made. The burden of proof would then shift from the applicant to the respondent to justify its
actions.
In Z. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform78 McGuinness J. seemed to signal a
somewhat cautious approach to the question of a varying standard of review. She reiterated
the contention that judicial review is concerned not with the decision but with the decisionmaking process and affirmed the O’Keeffe test of reasonableness. She decided that the
standard of review with regard to reasonableness should not differ and in all cases the courts
were committed to “careful scrutiny”79 of decisions. She did however believe that where
constitutional rights are at stake, the standard of judicial scrutiny as set out in O’Keeffe may
fall short of what is likely to be required for their protection.
The potential for a change of direction was offered by the House of Lords in R v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department ex p. Bugdaycay80 where Lord Bridge spoke in terms of the
“most anxious scrutiny”81 being required in judicial review proceedings where human rights
were at issue. Lord Templeman opined “where the result of a flawed decision may imperil
life or liberty a special responsibility lies on a court in the examination of the decision
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making process.”82 In R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith83 the Applicants sought to
challenge the decision to exclude them from the armed forces on the grounds of
homosexuality. The English Court of Appeal regarded itself as bound to a Wednesbury type
rationality test (slightly heightened because of the human rights context) when considering
whether a blanket policy to exclude homosexuals from the armed forces was justifiable.
The test of irrationality in this case was determined to be that a court was not entitled to
interfere with the exercise of an administrative decision on substantive grounds, save where
the court was satisfied that the decision was unreasonable in the sense that it was beyond the
range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. As there were human rights aspects
to this case, the Court emphasised that: “The more substantial the interference with human
rights, the more the court would require by way of justification before it was satisfied that the
decision was reasonable.”84 The Court ruled that the decision made was not irrational as it
was not beyond the range of responses open to a reasonable decision-maker. The Court was
reluctant to intervene in a “policy laden” decision.
A number of recent cases in this jurisdiction have questioned the appropriateness of the
O'Keeffe test, in relation to cases where fundamental rights are at stake. In A.O. and D.L v
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform85 Keane C.J. was satisfied that the decisions
made in this case were not manifestly contrary to reason and common sense. However,
Fennelly J. dissenting expressed his view that a higher degree of scrutiny should apply where
constitutional rights are at stake. He agreed with the view of Denham J. in Laurentiu v.
Minister for Justice,86 where she stated that:
“Where, as was the position in the instant case, constitutional rights were at stake, such
a standard of judicial scrutiny must necessarily fall well short of what is likely to be
required for their protection.”
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a proportionality test to determine
whether rights, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, have been breached.
82
83
84
85
86

Ibid. at 528
[1997] AC 514
Ibid. at 554
[2003] 1 IR 1
[1999] 4 IR 26 at 62

26

Any interference with these rights must be proportionate and a fair balance struck between
the rights of the individual and the policy objectives of the Government. As Lord Hope stated
in R v. Shayler87
“A close and penetrating examination of the factual justification for the restriction is
needed, if the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention are to remain practical
and effective for everyone who wishes to exercise them.”
The majority of administrative decisions made in the asylum process are not policy based.
The decisions involve fact finding and risk assessment of an Applicant's fear of persecution,
rather than the balancing of policy considerations against established rights. Decisions made
in the asylum process have become reasonably detailed and the reasons for reaching the
decisions made can, therefore, be adduced more easily and clearly. This is necessary to have
due account of the European Convention on Human Rights and to show that a fair balance
has been struck between Convention rights and the common good. However, should the
O'Keeffe test be successfully challenged more demanding standards would be put on
decision-makers to fully furnish the sources of information and reasons for the decisions
made.
The issue of the test applicable is the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court, leave in that
regard having been granted by Gilligan J. in Meadows v. Minister for Justice & Ors.88
identifying the question:
“In determining the reasonableness of an administrative decision which affects or
concerns constitutional rights or fundamental rights is it correct to apply the standard
as set out in O'Keeffe v An Bord Pleanála?”
The Supreme Court may look at using the doctrine of proportionality and whether the correct
balance has been struck by the decision maker, not merely whether it was within the range of
rational or reasonable decisions.89 While decisions taken pursuant to the lawful operation of

87
88
89

[2002] 2 WLR 754
Unreported, High Court, Gilligan J., 19th November, 2003
R(Daly) v. Home Secretary [2001] 2 WLR 1622

27

immigration control have been upheld as proportionate90 the question should be asked in
deciding whether a measure is proportionate:
“whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a
fundamental right; (ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are
rationally connected to it; and (iii) the means used to impair the right or freedom are no
more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.”91
The courts have been increasingly focusing on the doctrine of proportionality in for example
Gashi v Minister for Justice High Court92 where Clarke J found that the Minister must make
his decision “in a manner which is not disproportionate to the ends sought to be achieved.”
Also in Spartariu & Spartariu v Minister for Justice,93 the Applicants were a Romanian
couple and the husband was lawfully residing and working in the State. The Minister refused
the wife leave to remain, giving the standard reason that it was necessary to uphold the
immigration and asylum laws in the State. Peart J. granted leave on the basis that:
“there has not been carried out the exercise of considering and balancing the competing
interests and factors, as appears to have been required by the ECHR, in order to satisfy
that the measure is necessary in a democratic society, and therefore proportionate to the
objective to be achieved.”94
It could be argued that, the approach of Peart J., in applying the more recent jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is more in keeping with the duty under the
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, to take proper account of the Convention
and the ECtHR case law.
In the recent case of N v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform95 however, Mc
Carthy J. was satisfied to proceed on the basis of existing law as set down in O'Keeffe as it
has not been overruled or departed from by the Supreme Court. He stated:
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“It might be argued that judicial review could be granted on the sole ground that socalled “heightened scrutiny” is applicable to the decision, whatever the apparent merits
of that decision at this stage. Having regard to the present state of the authorities as to
the application of this new or different test I respectfully do not agree and, accordingly
if and insofar as judicial review is sought solely upon the test to be applied, I will not
grant it upon that basis.”
A different approach was taken by Charleton J. in N & Ors v. Minister for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform96 where the applicants were challenging a refusal by the Respondent to grant
subsidiary protection, pursuant to Directive 2004/83/EC. In the course of refusing leave to
take judicial review, Charleton J. stated at para. 57 that:
“The reality of the multiplicity of written decisions on judicial review matters
emanating from the High Court displays strong evidence for the proposition that
judges in considering the actions of the statutory bodies under the Refugee Act, 1996,
exercise a heightened level of scrutiny when compared to other forms of judicial
review that concerns administrative decision makers.”
He went on to say that:
“...a decision on the country of origin information of the applicant and the availability
of protection within its territory should be scrutinized if a judicial review is taken and
the decision should only stand if it be a rational one that is fairly supported by the
country of origin information.”
The courts of the United Kingdom, which apply a largely identical regime in respect of
judicial review, have evolved the doctrine of “anxious scrutiny” whereby a higher level of
scrutiny is applied to cases involving fundamental human rights. This matter should soon
come before the Supreme Court in this jurisdiction. As the European Convention on Human
Rights has now been given full effect in this jurisdiction, decisions made by the Minister will,
in any case, require a careful consideration of Convention rights, rather than merely giving
minimal reasons for decisions made or relying on standard policy considerations.
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Chapter 3: NOTICE
Under section 5(2)(b) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, an application for
judicial review must be made by motion, on notice to the Minister and any other person
specified for that purpose by order of the High Court. Prior to 2000, judicial review
proceedings were taken ex parte, that is without notice to the other side and the Minister was
not represented in Court at the preliminary stage. It was felt that the Minister should have the
opportunity to offer argument and facts at an early stage on the question of whether the
application is based on substantial grounds, therefore this requirement was introduced. For
public policy reasons it is appropriate for those making public decisions to be in a position to
defend their actions at an early stage and the requirement to put the Minister on notice was
designed with this point in mind.
The requirement has resulted in a situation where cases are run and by and large, determined,
at the leave stage, with a resultant shortage of High Court jurisprudence at the substantive
stage. Stack and Shipsey97 believe that the requirement must remove a large part, if not all of
the benefit to the Respondent as the necessity to hear the rebutting arguments of the Minister
requires an extended time for hearing of the application for leave. Stack and Shipsey98 also
criticise the fact that the Minister may be restrained from acting on foot of a decision for
several months where leave has been refused in the High Court.
Planning legislation contains similar notice requirements and in KSK Enterprises Ltd v An
Bord Pleanála99 Finlay C.J. analysed the statutory provisions in relation to the notice
requirements in applications for judicial review in planning matters. There he held that the
requirements of the amended section 82 of the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Act 1963, were satisfied by the filing in the Central Office of the High Court,
and the service on all necessary parties of the notice of motion within two months of the date
of the impugned decision, and that if the notice of motion was not served on all the parties
provided for mandatorily by statute, the application could not be deemed to have been made
within the two months limited by section 82. On the facts of this case, the Applicant had only
served An Bord Pleanála within the time limited and by not serving the other Respondents the
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application was time-barred and could not be maintained.
The Law Reform Commission100 has recommended aligning the notice requirements under
s.5 with conventional judicial review proceedings so that a judicial discretion will exist to
conduct inter partes applications for leave on notice “only in exceptional cases.” Simons101
has commented that:
“The fact that the respondents are on notice of the application for leave to apply has
the result that the application for leave now generally takes the form of an inter partes
hearing. Thus one benefit of the ex parte procedure, namely the attempt to spare
public authorities the necessity of taking any steps in relation to trivial or unstateable
cases by filtering out same at an ex parte hearing, is lost.”
The recommendation by the Law Reform Commission along with the comments by Simons
are very logical in my opinion, however the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008
has identical notice requirements to those which exist under section 5(2)(b) of the Illegal
Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000.
Recently Finlay Geoghegan J. has also proposed that in certain cases applications for leave
would be heard as a ‘telescopic hearing’ so that the leave and substantive cases are heard
together. This proposal, if it becomes common practice would be of great assistance in
reducing the lengthy list of cases which are before the Court awaiting a date for hearing.102

Legal Proceedings Non - Suspensive of Deportation
An interesting point came before the Supreme Court in Cosma v Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform103 where it was considered whether injunctive relief should be
granted restraining the deportation of the applicant pending the determination of her appeal
from the decision of the High Court. Although the provisions of s.5(3) of the Illegal
Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 did not apply in this case, as the applicant was challenging
100
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the refusal of the Minister to revoke a deportation order in respect of her application under s.3
(11) of the Immigration Act 1999, which is not covered by s.5, the Supreme Court considered
whether it should use its inherent power to grant an interlocutory order pending the hearing of
the appeal to protect the applicant's rights. Reference was made to Ord. 58, r.18 of the Rules
of the Superior Courts 1986 which provides that:
“An appeal to the Supreme Court shall not operate as a stay of execution or of
proceedings under the decision appealed from, except so far as the High Court or the
Supreme Court may order; and no intermediate act or proceeding shall be thereby
invalidated, except so far as the High Court or the Supreme Court may direct.”
McCracken J., refused to grant an injunction, stating:
“If the court were to grant an injunction such as is being sought by the appellant, the
effect would be to thwart the operation of the perfectly valid deportation order and
would, at least to some degree, prevent the operation of a perfectly valid and
unappealable High Court order.”104
This was applied by the High Court in the recent case of Akujobi v Minister for Justice,
Equality and Law Reform,105 where MacMenamin J. was also faced with an application to
restrain the Minister from deporting the Applicant, who had not challenged the validity of the
deportation order made against him. He stated “where, as here, the original order for
deportation has not been impugned in any proceedings, it stands unchallenged and thus no
injunction should be granted at all.”106
This is in line with the position taken by the Supreme Court in Adebayo & Ors v.
Commissioner of An Garda Síochána107 where it was held that if the subject of a deportation
order does not lodge judicial review proceedings within fourteen days of the serving of the
order the person may no longer get an injunction for preventing their deportation. Therefore
where the fourteen day period under the Act of 2000 has expired, the State is entitled to
deport a person notwithstanding that an application for leave to bring judicial review
104
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proceedings, with the accompanying application for an extension of time had been made,
unless an interim injunction had been obtained from the Court preventing the deportation. In
this case Geoghegan J. also determined that deportation does not interfere with the
Applicant’s constitutionally protected right of access to the courts to enforce his legal rights,
as the judicial review application can proceed normally in the Applicant’s absence. The right
of access to the courts it was held is merely a right to initiate litigation in the courts.
Under Article 39 of the Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC), there is no
express requirement for states to offer an administrative or in-country appeal, simply to
ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an effective remedy before a court or
tribunal. No attempt was made to present a set of rationally justifiable circumstances in which
it might be appropriate to allow an applicant to remain pending the outcome of an appeal.
Under s.118(9) of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008 which transposed this
directive, an application by a foreign national for leave to apply for judicial review of a
transfer under s.104 of the Bill or of a removal of the foreign national from the State or leave
to apply for an extension of time, shall not of itself suspend or prevent his or her transfer or,
as the case may be, removal from the State. However, the Court may suspend the transfer or
removal for such period as it is satisfied is necessary for the foreign national to give
instructions to his or her legal representative in relation to the application where it is satisfied
that the giving of such instructions would otherwise be impossible.108

Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court
Article 34.4.3° of the Constitution of Ireland 1937 provides that “the Supreme Court shall,
with such exceptions and subject to such regulation as may be prescribed by law, have
appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court, and shall also have appellate
jurisdiction from such decisions of other courts as may be prescribed by law.” This Article
clearly contemplates that exceptions to and regulation of the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction may be prescribed by law, however, an Act of the Oireachtas seeking to achieve
this must be “clear and unambiguous”.109 Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking)
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Act 2000 stipulates that there is to be no appeal unless the High Court certifies that its own
decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is in the public
interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court.110 The formula in s.5 mirrors
that in s.19 of the Local Government (Planning and Development) Act 1992 and in the
Supreme Court case of Irish Hardware Association v. South Dublin County Council111 Keane
C.J. stated:
“It would be in the teeth of it if this court were to construe the provisions as enabling
an appeal in every case to be brought from either the refusal to grant such a certificate
or, indeed, the grant of the certificate. That would involve this court in at least some
consideration of the merits of the substantive decision in the High Court, entirely
contrary to the philosophy which clearly prompted the relevant provisions.”
Therefore it is clear that the High Court alone has power to issue a certificate to appeal a
point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that
an appeal should be taken. Where no such certificate is issued, the Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the High Court. A comprehensive distillation of the
principles to be derived from the significant body of case law in this area was referred to and
applied by Clarke J. in Arklow Holdings v. An Bord Pleanála & Ors.112
Where leave is refused in an application for judicial review i.e. in circumstances where
substantial grounds have not been established, a question may arise as to whether, logically,
the same material can constitute a point of law of exceptional public importance such as to
justify certification for an appeal to the Supreme Court. Simons113 has commented that:
“It is difficult to understand how an insubstantial ground of challenge could ever be
said to amount to a point of law of exceptional public importance.”
The Law Reform Commission114 recommended the appointment of a single Supreme Court
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judge to review a refusal of a certificate of appeal to guard against these concerns.
Order 58, rule 3(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 states that:
“the notice of appeal shall in every case be a ten-day notice and subject to the
provisions of this Order, shall be served not later than twenty-one days from the
passing and perfecting of the judgement or order appealed against.”
While there is no time limit laid down in the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 for
lodging appeals it is important that parties act promptly, when seeking to appeal a High Court
judgment. In Ní Ghruagáin v An Bord Pleanála115 for example, an application for leave to
appeal three months after judgment, was refused on grounds of delay. Therefore, where the
application is not made promptly and no explanation is offered to justify the delay, it would
seem unlikely that the High Court will accede to a request for an appeal to the Supreme
Court.
The case of AB v Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform116 concerned the
interpretation of s.5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants Trafficking Act 2000, where the Appellant
wished to appeal against an order refusing an extension of the 14 day time limit. Keane C.J.
commented strongly on the apparent incongruity of enacting provisions restricting the right of
appeal in respect of the substantive judicial review decision, while imposing no limits in
respect of the decision in respect of an extension of time:

“It would be remarkable if the Oireachtas, in seeking to attain those objectives, had
severely circumscribed the right to appeal to this court from decisions by the High
Court on the merits of applications for judicial review, but had allowed an unrestricted
right of appeal where an applicant was, by definition, already out of time.”117
Nonetheless, he proceeded:
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“However, it is to the words used by the legislature that we must have regard in
ascertaining its intention and if, as so construed, these provisions mean that the right
of appeal is indeed unrestricted in such cases, it is not the function of the courts to
remedy such a casus omissus, if that is what it is. That would be a weighty
consideration in every case: in this case, there is the additional factor that the right of
appeal to this court provided for in Article 34.4.3 may only be removed or abridged
by a statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous..”118

Delaney119 has commented that:

“Given the fact that the time period within which an application for review may be
made is so short, it seems inevitable that applicants will need to seek an extension in
many cases and they will undoubtedly utilise the unfettered right of appeal if such
extension is refused by the High Court. Whether this was the result intended by the
legislature or not, it therefore seems inevitable that the Supreme Court’s time will be
taken up in hearing appeals against a refusal to extend the time for seeking judicial
review in cases of this nature.”

It emerges from the foregoing that any legislative attempt to limit either the right or the scope
of the constitutionally conferred right of litigants to appeal decisions of the High Court must
be expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. There must not be any lack of clarity or
ambiguity.

The Supreme Court in Clinton v An Bord Pleanála120 considered the point of whether the
Applicant was confined in the appeal to the single ground of appeal arising from the certified
point of law which had been identified, or whether he was entitled to raise other grounds.
Section 50(4)(f)(i) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 also mirrors the requirements
of obtaining a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court in s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants
(Trafficking) Act 2000. In written submissions on behalf of the applicant it was submitted
118
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that the appeal is not confined to the single ground of appeal arising from the point of law, the
subject of the High Court certificate, for three reasons. First, that the constitutional position is
that an appeal to the Supreme Court from every decision of the High Court is a matter of
right, unless limited by statute and a statutory provision limiting such right of appeal ought to
be strictly construed. It was submitted that the statutory language in this case is not
sufficiently clear and unambiguous to warrant an interpretation which would limit the appeal
to the “certified point of law”. Secondly, once an appeal is properly before the Supreme
Court, the Court cannot be expected to allow a decision that it knows to be erroneous to
stand, merely because the source of the error is not to be found in the important point of law
that brings the matter before the Court. Thirdly, the Supreme Court cannot be precluded from
consideration of grounds of appeal that may admit a constitutionally sound interpretation of a
post-1937 statute, where to foreclose such consideration means that the same statute must be
struck down.
An Bord Pleanála filed written legal submissions, referring to case law on the appropriate
construction of s.50(4)(f) of the Planning and Development Act 2000, in essence submitting
that the appeal was limited to the certified question. Reference was made by the Court to
People (Attorney General) v Giles121 where Walsh J. held that although the granting of the
certificate gives the right of appeal the certificate does not limit the scope of the appeal and
the Supreme Court were satisfied in Clinton that the Appellant is not confined to arguing the
certified point.
Stack and Shipsey122 have commented that:

“In addition to any principled objection to the restriction on appeal, section 5 may
also be criticised for being clumsy in its effects. Once a single point of law of
exceptional public importance is identified, section 5 ceases to govern the appeal,
which is then taken in accordance with the ordinary procedures for appeal. As a result,
all issues can thereafter be canvassed on appeal. This could lead to the very
unsatisfactory position of an applicant succeeding on appeal on a ground which was
individual to his case, even though the vast preponderance of applicants had no right
121
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to appeal because they had failed to identify a point of law of exceptional public
importance.”
However, it would have been easy for the Oireachtas to specify that the appeal was limited to
that point and the legislature has chosen not to do so. Interestingly new planning legislation
came into force on October 17, 2006 and under Section 13 of the Planning and Development
(Strategic Infrastructure) Act, 2006 which substituted a new s.50 of the Planning and
Development Act, 2000. S.50A (10) provides:
(11) On an appeal from a determination of the Court in respect of an application
referred to in subsection (10), the Supreme Court shall—
(a) have jurisdiction to determine only the point of law certified by the Court under
subsection (7) (and to make only such order in the proceedings as follows from such
determination), and
(b) in determining the appeal, act as expeditiously as possible consistent with the
administration of justice.”
This development may be an approach taken to any possible future amendment to the current
restrictions to appeal. Recommendations were made by the Law Reform Commission123
discussed below, proposing that specific grounds of appeal should be certified by the High
Court when granting a certificate and where an applicant has been refused leave in the High
Court and also refused a certificate of appeal, that a facility be available to such applicant
whereby a single judge of the Supreme Court can review the matter so as to preclude any
potential for injustice. The restriction remains unchanged in s.118(5) of the Immigration
Residence and Protection Bill 2008.

International Standards
“International law has little to say with respect to the procedural aspects of due process”.124
The Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees set down
at its twenty-eighth session in October 1977 that if an applicant is not successful in their
application for asylum or refugee status at first instance, he should be given a reasonable time
to appeal for a formal reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to a different
123
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authority, whether administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system. With an
appeals mechanism to the Refugee Appeals Tribunal currently and the opportunity to initiate
judicial review proceedings on both the initial decision and the decision on appeal I believe
this country adequately meets its international obligations in this respect.
Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights is broadly speaking, the
Convention's fair trial provision, however, it is questionable whether the protection under
Article 6(1) of the ECHR extends to immigration decisions. Despite the fact that a decision to
deport a person can certainly lead to a violation of his or her rights protected under the
Convention, such applications have consistently been rejected as inadmissible by the Court.
In Maaouia v. France125 the Court concluded that decisions regarding the entry, stay and
deportation of aliens do not concern the determination of an applicant's civil rights or
obligations, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention. However, increasing
reference is being had to Article 6(1) in recent case law.
In Edobor v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal126 there was a delay of approximately 15 months
between the oral hearing of the Applicant's appeal and the issue of the tribunal decision.
Kearns J. referred to the European Court of Human Rights decision of McMullen v. Ireland127
and highlighted the principle that administrative tribunals which perform judicial type
functions have an obligation to deal with appeals as soon as may be. Article 6 of the
Convention emphasises that a State is obliged to organise its legal system so as to allow its
courts to comply with the 'reasonable time' requirement. As an applicant only has 14 days
from the date of the Tribunal's determination to bring judicial review proceedings, there is a
clear onus on the members of the Tribunal to act expeditiously and promptly. In this case the
Tribunal failed to provide any explanation for the inactivity and accordingly the judgment of
the High Court in favour of the Applicant was upheld.
In Atanasov v Refugee Appeals Tribunal128 a point of law came before the Supreme Court, as
to whether an appellant before the Refugee Appeals Tribunal is legally and/or constitutionally
entitled to access previous decisions of the Tribunal in which similar and, therefore, relevant
issues of law arose. The Applicants claimed that failure to afford them access to previous
125
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decisions of legal significance was a breach of their rights to fair procedures and/or natural
justice and, furthermore, infringed the requirement of equality of arms under Article 6(1) of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Geoghegan J. determined that where an
applicant in advance of a hearing by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal (RAT) has requested
access to relevant precedents and has been refused, this breaches the applicant’s rights to fair
procedures and natural and constitutional justice. He acknowledged the argument made that
the requirement of equality of arms under article 6(1) of the ECHR would require that such
information should be available to both sets of legal advisors. However, in deciding on
constitutional grounds, he held that it was unnecessary to consider the matter under the
ECHR. This decision has been welcomed by the Law Society of Ireland.129
Interestingly in the new Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008 under section 95 a
protection applicant may, but only at the time of making an appeal under section 84, apply in
the prescribed manner to the chairperson of the Protection Review Tribunal, for the provision
to him or her any decision of the Tribunal which is legally relevant to his or her appeal.130
Therefore, it is clear that the fair trial requirements under the European Convention on
Human Rights are becoming increasingly important and relevant in the asylum and
immigration context.
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Chapter 4: REFORMS
There have been many proposed reforms to the statutory restrictions imposed on persons
wishing to initiate judicial review proceedings in asylum matters, I intend to summarise here
the most persuasive proposals.
Regarding the requirement to put the Minister on notice of proceedings, the Law Reform
Commission in its Report on Judicial Review Procedure131 felt that this requirement was at
the root of the problem of “double hearings”, i.e. that the leave and substantive cases were
practically identical, which results in lengthy delays in the determination of cases. The
Commission recommended the creation of judicial discretion whether to hear proceedings on
an ex parte or inter partes basis at the leave stage. Given the fact that Respondents in many
cases concede leave in an effort to speed up the time taken to fully determine proceedings and
to minimise costs it is my opinion that this judicial discretion should be introduced. While
decisions made in the course of the asylum process can be of significant importance I
consider that it would be of interest to both parties to introduce this recommendation, as the
judge could still direct that the Minister be given notice of cases which are of greater
importance. This proposal would work particularly well where many cases with similar
grounds are initiated by several applicants and a test case has been identified, which when
determined, will determine the outcome of all cases put behind this test case.
On the 6th December 2007, several hundred cases were listed before the High Court in the
asylum judicial review list, which had not yet been assigned a hearing date. Given the large
number of cases involved, Finlay Geoghegan J. directed that in cases where parties were
seeking a priority hearing date, they should consider whether the hearing should proceed as a
telescopic hearing, i.e. that the leave application and substantive case be heard together. She
directed that the applicant’s solicitors in such a case should write to the respondent, who
should reply indicating their attitude. If the respondents were agreeing to a telescopic hearing,
they would need to have a draft Statement of Opposition available at the hearing, so that if
the Court was satisfied an applicant could show substantial grounds for leave, the case would
proceed to substantive determination. Finlay Geoghegan J. also cautioned the respondents
that if they did not agree to this form of hearing and in such a case the Court was satisfied
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that the applicant had established grounds for leave, there could be cost implications for the
respondents. The justification for this form of hearing appears to be that it will be of benefit
to both parties in that cases will be fully determined more quickly.

This issue is closely allied to the problem of “double hearings”, which as has been suggested
results in inefficient use of court time. While this procedure would be beneficial in cases
which require urgent determinations such as transfer order or imminent deportation cases,
respondents would be much more reluctant to agree to this in cases where applicants raise
numerous grounds in the Statement of Grounds which the respondent would need to address
in detail in a draft Statement of Opposition for the purpose of a telescopic hearing. Often the
Court allows an applicant to introduce a wholly new ground during the course of the leave
hearing and therefore in a telescopic hearing the respondent could be prejudiced by this.132 In
short the respondent could well be ambushed in such a hearing.
Regarding the ability of an applicant to introduce new grounds into proceedings, the Law
Reform Commission133 recommended adopting the more flexible approach in Ó
Síodhacháin134 based on the imperative of doing justice within the law. In so doing the
Commission pointed to the potential for injustice arising from an absolutist standpoint to the
time limit with regard to applications for amendments to the grant of leave. However, the
Commission concluded this must not be used as a mechanism to avoid the constraints of the
requirements which are applied to all applications for leave and should instead be limited to
genuine freshly discovered grounds. This recommendation appears to have been taken on
board under s.118(3)(a) of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008, in relation to
when the Court can grant an extension of time to the fourteen day time limit to bring
proceedings.
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The 14 day time limit, although onerous, was found by the Law Reform Commission135 not,
in the majority of cases, to be acting as a barrier to the applicant. The vast majority of
applicants are not falling at the time limits hurdle; however, the Commission found that this
was due to the liberal application of the power of the Courts to extend the time limit. The
Commission noted that applicants may also be going through a certain degree of trauma and
may not even know of their right to seek judicial review due to language barriers and
unfamiliarity with the legal system. Taking into account the fact that a failed immigration
applicant should not be able to use judicial review proceedings to delay the implementation
of decisions taken during the process, the Commission recommended increasing the time
limit to 28 days to reflect the current situation.136
The Law Reform Commission137 was satisfied that on the whole, the higher standard of
“substantial grounds” should be retained in statutory judicial review proceedings. The reasons
for its retention focus on the policy behind such legislation and particularly the damage that
could be done to public interests and public funds, if there was no filtering mechanism to
prevent the initiation of wholly unmeritorious proceedings, with no obstacle to such cases
proceeding to the substantive hearing. This is so particularly in light of the recommendation
that the mandatory requirement in statutory judicial review proceedings that the leave stage
be held on notice should be amended. The requirement of establishing that substantial
grounds exist has been further copper-fastened by the possibility of judges directing that the
costs, or a part of the costs of the proceedings, shall be borne by the legal representative of
the applicant under s.118(8) of the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008.
An interesting point was made by McKechnie J. in Kenny v. An Bord Pleanála (No.2),138 that
where leave is refused it must be the case that the applicant has failed to establish the
requirement of raising substantial grounds. Having failed to meet this threshold he questioned
the logic that if a point of law of exceptional public interest can be identified, then surely a
substantial ground exists and leave should have been granted. If this was the case then no
appeal would ever go to the Supreme Court at leave stage as any point of law of exceptional
public interest identified would have already resulted in leave being granted. While the onus
is heavy on the applicant to meet the requirements of obtaining an appeal, it is the same High
135 “
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Court judge who determined that substantial grounds have not been put forward who will
have to decide whether or not a point of law of exceptional public importance exists. The
Law Reform Commission139 recommended the appointment of a single Supreme Court judge
to review a refusal of a certificate of appeal to guard against these concerns and insulate the
process so as to negate criticisms arising from the possibly embarrassingly contradictory
position imposed on the High Court.
On 29th January 2008 the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill was published. The
2008 Bill incorporates the European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations
2006 which transposed the EU Council Directive on Minimum Standards for the
Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as
Persons who otherwise need International Protection (“Qualifications Directive”).140 It also
effects transposition into Irish domestic law of the EU Council Directive on Minimum
Standards on Procedures in Member States for the Granting and Withdrawing of Refugee
Status (“Procedures Directive”). Under s.131(f) of this Bill, s.5 of the Illegal Immigrants
(Trafficking) Act 2000 is to be repealed and replaced by a new section to legislate for judicial
review proceedings. Section 118, largely based on s.5 of the 2000 Act retains:



The 14 time limit within which judicial review proceedings must be taken.141



The need for applications to bring judicial review proceedings to be made on notice to
the Minister.



The need to satisfy the High Court that substantial grounds exist that the act, decision
or determination is invalid or ought to be quashed.



The fact that the determination of the High Court of an application for leave to apply
for judicial review is final and an appeal shall lie from that determination only with
the leave of the High Court, which leave shall be granted only where the High Court
certifies that its decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and
that it is desirable in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme
Court.
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Some interesting changes have been proposed in this Bill however. Firstly, under s.5 of the
2000 Act the time period of fourteen days can only be extended by the High Court where
there is “good and sufficient” reason for doing so. In what appears to be an attempt to alter
the fact that an extension of time is granted so readily by the Court, the Bill has specified a
limited number of situations where an extension of time may be granted.
Under s.118(3) of the Bill, the High Court may not extend the fourteen day period unless the
applicant satisfies the Court that they:
(1) (i) did not become aware until after that period’s expiration of the material facts on
which the grounds for his or her application are based, or
(ii) became aware of those facts before that period’s expiration but only after such
number of days of that period had elapsed as would have made it not reasonably
practicable for the applicant to have made his or her application for leave before that
period’s expiration;
(2) with reasonable diligence, could not have become aware of those facts until after the
expiration of that period, or, as the case may be, that number of days had elapsed;
(3) made their application for leave as soon as was reasonably practicable after the
applicant became aware of those facts; or
that there are other exceptional circumstances relating to the applicant and under
which, through no fault of the applicant, his or her application could not have been
made within that period.142
Another interesting proposal regarding the extension of time seeks to overturn the principle
set down by the Supreme Court in B and S v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law
Reform143 that a person who has been refused an extension of time for leave to apply for
142
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judicial review may bring an appeal without first obtaining leave. Section 118(4)(c) of the
Bill sets down that the decision of the High Court on an application to extend the time limit
for bringing judicial review proceedings can only be appealed with the leave of the High
Court and shall be granted only where the High Court certifies that its decision involves a
point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that
an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court. This indeed is important as one of the main
aims of the Bill is to ensure that judicial review cases are determined rapidly and do not end
up sitting in a Court list for several years.
A question mark hangs over the constitutionality of this provision because in the B and S case
McGuinness J. placed a high value on the power to extend the time limit, acknowledging that
the constitutionality of section 5 had hinged on it in In re Article 26 of the Constitution and
sections 5 and 10 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999.144 Geoghegan J. stated
that an extension may be “absolutely vital”145 and hence the automatic right of appeal to the
Supreme Court would make an immense difference in protecting rights. His sentiments were
echoed by Fennelly J. who considered “the power of the court to extend the time … is of
potentially decisive importance for the protection of the constitutional right of access to the
courts of persons affected by decisions vital to their interests”.146 Only Keane C.J. seemed
more cautious, highlighting the significance of the need for expedition in bringing to
conclusion such matters.
There are several other innovations in this Bill which attempt to prevent the misuse of the
judicial process by a foreign national solely for the purposes of frustrating their removal from
the State. For example under s.118(9) an application by a foreign national for leave to apply
for judicial review of a transfer under s.104 of the Bill or of a removal of the foreign national
from the State or leave to apply for an extension of time, shall not of itself suspend or prevent
his or her transfer or, as the case may be, removal from the State. However, the Court may
suspend the transfer or removal for such period as it is satisfied is necessary for the foreign
national to give instructions to his or her legal representative in relation to the application
where it is satisfied that the giving of such instructions would otherwise be impossible.147
144
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Pursuant to Article 39 of the Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC), there is
no express requirement for states to offer an administrative or in-country appeal, simply to
ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an effective remedy before a court or
tribunal.
This provision is of concern to solicitors given the practical difficulties that arise with
progressing a case where the client is outside the jurisdiction and more particularly from an
applicant's perspective, given the potential dangers faced by them on their return to their
country of origin.148 The Irish Human Rights Commission has submitted that:
“The IHRC considers that it is clear from the jurisprudence of the ECtHR149 that the
Irish authorities cannot rely automatically on the arrangements made under the Dublin
Convention and should engage in a thorough assessment as to whether there is a real
risk that the return of the person to a “safe third country” will indirectly expose that
person to a substantial risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.”150
This section in the Bill merely reflects the current position that where a person initiates
judicial review proceedings, the transfer order is not automatically suspended. The applicant
must be granted an injunction by the Court before the transfer order is suspended. There is a
risk in my opinion of this section being challenged in the European Court of Human Rights
under Article 13 where the only available remedy to an applicant to assert their rights is to
instigate judicial review proceedings.151 Case law of the European Court of Human Rights
pursuant to Article 13 in Conka v. Belgium152 and Hilal v. the United Kingdom153 confirms a
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right to remain in the territory until a final decision is issued once an arguable case is raised
on a Convention provision. While many may argue that the Minister should expressly provide
for judicial review with suspensive effect, this, I consider, is not necessary as the Courts will
nonetheless be able to injunct any potential transfer or deportation.
A rather controversial proposal under s.118(7) and (8) is that where, in the opinion of the
Court, the grounds put forward for contending that an act, decision or determination is invalid
or ought to be quashed are frivolous or vexatious, the Court may, (whether on application or
on its own motion) by its order, so declare and shall direct by whom and in what proportion
the costs are to be borne and paid. The section goes on to state that where the Court forms an
opinion of this kind, it may direct that the costs or a part of the costs, of the proceedings shall
be borne by the legal representative of the Applicant.154 This section if it becomes law would
have a significant deterrent factor for solicitors who attempt to bring proceedings where
substantial grounds do not exist.
Whether or not the High Court will be willing to strike out a case for being frivolous or
vexatious remains to be seen. I would be sceptical that the Courts would order a solicitor to
personally bear the costs of a case. Orders under Order 99 Rule 7 of the Superior Courts,
similar to English wasted costs orders, have been rarely made in Ireland and it is likely that
the Irish courts will continue to be hesitant about making such orders. In Kennedy v. Kileen155
the High Court concluded that the facts of the case fell far short of the exceptional
circumstances which might justify a wasted costs type order. The Court held that such orders
should be confined to cases where clearly a legal representative acting in litigation had been
in serious default. The Law Reform Commission in its Report on Judicial Review
Procedure156 recommended that the leave stage be retained because of the High Court's
reluctance to use its inherent jurisdiction to strike out frivolous or vexatious proceedings.
Order 19, rule 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 provides that a court may order a
pleading to be struck out on the grounds that “it discloses no reasonable cause of action or
answer” and that, in any case, where the action or defence is shown by the pleadings to be
154
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“frivolous or vexatious”, the court may order that the action be stayed or dismissed or that
judgment may be entered accordingly. In Garibov & Anor v Minister for Justice, Equality
and Law Reform157 Herbert J., examined what the Courts should consider in deciding whether
or not a case was unmeritorious. He analysed whether:
“the decision to commence these judicial review proceedings was a proportionate
reaction in the applicants to the situation arising from the decisions and actions of the
respondents, their servants and agents; the decision to commence these judicial review
proceedings was clearly based upon identified, existing and relevant constitutional,
statutory and additionally or alternatively legal rules and principles; the decision to
commence these judicial review proceedings was on its face manifestly, (as distinct
from arguably) frivolous or obviously unstateable and for the purpose of delay; any
alternative course of action was reasonably available to the applicants which would
not have exposed the respondents to the risk of incurring legal costs; the applicants
had afforded the respondents a reasonable opportunity, insofar as the particular
circumstances of the case would permit of addressing and responding to their claims
before commencing these proceedings.”
In this case, which was a costs hearing, Herbert J. found nothing in the conduct of the
applicants or in the manner in which this application was prosecuted by them which would
permit the court to deprive the applicants of those costs or to award costs to the respondents.
The Law Society has commented that the provision may also breach the European
Convention on Human Rights under the “equality of arms” provision under Article 6 of the
ECHR.158
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Conclusion
It is clear that the restrictions placed on those wishing to initiate judicial review proceedings
challenging decisions made in the asylum process are not having the effect which the
Executive desired. This can be seen from the lengthy asylum court list and even more so from
the list to fix dates159 which, in recent times has had approximately 800 cases waiting to be
assigned a hearing date in Court, with the inevitable result that some cases are put back into
the list to fix dates time and time again with no progress on the case. This is clearly
undesirable for all concerned, as applicants are left in limbo, unsure as to whether they will
be deported or allowed to stay, while at the same time building connections in the State and
the respondent is unable to act on decisions made. The legislature has a difficult and delicate
balancing act to achieve in the new Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill in deterring
potential applicants who have weak grounds from initiating judicial review proceedings and
little chance of success, while at the same time ensuring that human rights are respected and
legitimate applicants are given a fair chance of challenging a negative decision.
The proposals in the Bill in my opinion go too far in restricting a potential applicant’s ability
to initiate proceedings, in particular the short time limit. I believe this should be 28 days, with
a restriction on the Court’s ability to extend this limit amended as proposed in the Bill. I
consider that with judicial discretion to hear leave applications on an ex parte or inter partes
basis and Court orders affixing legal representatives with costs where frivolous and vexatious
cases are initiated along with innovations such as telescopic hearings, the number of cases
taken will be reduced and the cases currently awaiting determination will be concluded in a
shorter timeframe. In my opinion the High Court should have discretion to stay judicial
review proceedings pending the making of a decision by the proposed Protection Review
Tribunal160 as the decision could be overturned at this stage leaving such proceedings against
the Office of the Refugee Applications Commissioner moot. I also consider that on appeal to
the Supreme Court, cases should be confined to the point of law, which has been identified
and certified by the High Court as a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it
is in the public interest that an appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court, rather than allow
additional grounds to be raised.
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A list of cases put into a single list which is usually listed near the end of a court term to assign hearing
dates in the next term.
Currently the Refugee Appeals Tribunal
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The Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill 2008, should it be enacted, will have a
significant effect on the statutory restrictions which have been placed on foreign nationals
wishing to initiate judicial review proceedings. Whether the proposed changes will survive a
constitutional challenge and stand up to international standards remains to be seen.
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